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The study, drawing on the political settlement approach, examines how powers, insti-
tutions, networks, and interests influence the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana.
Qualitative research approach was for the study, and purposive sampling was used to
interview 24 respondents. The findings suggest the existence of power struggles
among the key actors in the pricing of fuel. The findings revealed that the National
Petroleum Authority, bulk distribution oil companies, oil marketing companies, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and energy policy think tanks influence result into policy.
Actors influence fuel prices through taxes, policy guidelines, exchange rate, and legal
actions. The study recommends that capacity of the key players should be built by
the Government of Ghana so as to ensure healthy competition and stability in the
pricing of petroleum products in Ghana. Political interference in the pricing of fuel
should be limited so that the key players can operate successfully in the petroleum
downstream.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Petroleum politics has been of growing global interest in recent times.
Open many textbooks and research articles on energy politics, and the
phrase “fuel pricing” would show up (Gurney, 1996; Titeca & Edmond,
2019). Governments, researchers, and development practitioners in
Ghana and other parts of the world (Obeng-Odoom, 2015; Trabelsi,
2017) have shown keen interests in the issues surrounding petroleum
product governance and its pricing. The Finance Minister, Ken Ofori
Atta, in presenting the 2019 Ghana budget statement in accordance
with Article 179 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana
on November 15, 2018, indicated that, as of August 2018, the total
petroleum receipt was US$604.09 million (GH₵2.72 billion) and the
Benchmark crude oil price for 2019 has been projected at US$66.76
per barrel in line with the Petroleum Revenue Management Act
(Amendment), 2015 (PRMA, Act 893), in the year 2019 (MoF, 2018).
The great concerns shown by state actors as in the case of Ghana
position the pricing of fuel and its governance strategically in the Gha-
naian economy.
Heinrich and Pleines (2015) have argued that political elites in
countries like Ghana and other developing countries clearly perceive
themselves as key actors who determine the fate of the prices of
petroleum products. This is shown when the prices of petroleum
products increase on the international market. The government is
hesitant to increase the prices of fuel. However, when there is
reduction in the prices of fuel on the international markets, the gov-
ernment speeds to announce the reduction so as to achieve political
points (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). Gary (2009) has linked these
to extreme presidential power, incomplete independence of the
body that regulates the pricing of petroleum products, unclear
authority, and overlapping functions of the agencies handling issues
on petroleum pricing, limited role for parliament on issues con-
cerning energy, lack of transparency, and absence of outer limit for
commencement. Because of these obstructions, the powers and
interests of the actors involved in the pricing of fuel are not clearly
seen and understood. Boahen (2015) has also indicated that govern-
ments have played political games with the pricing of fuel. Through
campaign promises and political manifestoes, numerous govern-
ments have interfered with the pricing of fuel. Political actors have
made contentious decisions in the face of conflicting market funda-
mentals (Gingrich, 2011).
There are numerous literature on political economy and petroleum
pricing, classic (Gurney, 1996; Khan, 1994) and contemporary
(Li, Qiao & Zhao; Titeca & Edmond, 2019). Much of these literature
focus on the policies in implementing the prices of fuel, mostly in the
developed and developing countries (Rowland & Mjelde, 2016).
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Surprisingly, relatively few studies have looked at how the political
and economic processes influence natural resources policies (Dale,
Veland, & Hansen, 2018; Naylor & Higgins, 2017).
Presently, there appear to be limited literature on how these politi-
cal economic factors, institution, networks, and power, influence the
pricing of petroleum products in a sub-Saharan African country like
Ghana. This present study is going to fill the literature gap by examining
how institutions, networks, and powers influence the pricing of petro-
leum products in Ghana. More importantly, scholars (Broda, Krüger,
Schinke, &Weber, 2018; Gaudet, 2007) who have worked on the politi-
cal economy of fuel have not demonstrated enough theoretical proof
regarding how the political economic processes influence the pricing of
fuel in the developing countries. The available studies on fuel pricing are
often based on the rational choice theory or Hotelling's theory (Brandt,
2010; Rowland & Mjelde, 2016). Hotelling's theory argues that owners
of nonrenewable resources will only produce a supply of their basic
commodity if it can yield more than available financial instruments
(Gaudet, 2007). Rational choice theory relies on rational assumptions to
achieve outcomes (Broda et al., 2018). Though rational choice and
Hotelling theories have been used in other natural resources literature
(Broda et al., 2018; Gaudet, 2007), nevertheless, these theories may not
appropriately explain how political economic factors such as institutions
interact to influence the pricing of fuel.
This research, drawing on the political settlement theory examines
how powers, institutions, networks, and interests influence the pricing
of petroleum products in Ghana.
This study will contribute significantly to existing knowledge and
add value to practitioners, academics, and policymakers by specifically
examining the power struggles among the key actors involved in the
pricing of petroleum products in Ghana. The study will help
policymakers in the energy policy formulation process not only in
Ghana but also in other developing countries as well. Practitioners
would understand the petroleum market better with this study; this
would enable them in the fuel pricing implementation. The study will
also unpack the interests of the actors in the pricing of fuel in Ghana
and their policy outcomes. The findings of this research is expected to
provide an insight and in-depth understanding on how actors interact
to shape the pricing of petroleum products.
The study continues with a discussion of the theoretical frame-
work and reviews extant peer-reviewed literature pertaining to politi-
cal economy. The research strategy is explained followed by the
results and discussions. The paper concludes by discussing the impli-
cations, recommendations for the research and practice as well as
future research. References follow afterwards.
2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 | The political settlement theory
The theoretical basis of this study hinges on the political settlement
approach that emerged during the 1990s out of a critique of new
institutional economics developed by Khan (2005, 2010). The theory
has developed through various research works (country level and
individual level) on development in the developed and developing
countries (Oduro, Awal, & Ashon, 2014).
The political settlement theory was considered appropriate by the
researcher due to the research objectives the researcher hopes to
address. The study examines the relationships and interactions
between actors and institutions that shape the outcome of policies.
Recent study by Frederiksen (2019) has posited that the relationships
and interactions between actors in an organization concerning the
outcome of a policy is due to political settlement.
According to a recent study by Khan (2018) on “political settle-
ments and the analysis of institutions,” Khan argued that the political
settlement theory looks at how organizational power should be dis-
tributed or balances so as to understand the economic and the politi-
cal effects of institutions and policies. Institutions describe the rules
that determine policies and the allocation of resources (Khan, 2018).
Nevertheless, Kelsall (2018) responded to Mushtaq Khan's view
on political settlement in the study, Towards a Universal Political Settle-
ment Concept: A Response to Mushtaq Khan. Kelsall (2018) acknowl-
edge Khan's contribution on political settlement and further indicated
that the political settlement framework has been influential in the
recent development studies literature (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016; Oduro
et al., 2014). Studies by Oduro et al. (2014) and Abdulai and Hickey
(2016) have demonstrated through their researches how development
can be achieved through the political settlement approach.
Kelsall (2018) has critiqued and questioned Khan's political settle-
ment framework. The scholar has questioned the concepts, methods,
and analysis used by Khan. Kelsall (2018) argued that the political set-
tlement by Khan suffers from methodological, conceptual, and analyti-
cal ambiguity.
Khan (2018) replying to the concerns raised by Kelsall (2018) in
the study, Power, pacts and political settlements: A reply to Tim Kelsall,
indicated that there are gaps in how Kelsall (2018) analysed his view
on political settlement. Khan (2018) through his response to Kelsall
(2018) argues that to be consistent with everyday meaning, as well as
to ensure analytical usefulness, a political settlement has to be
defined. Khan defined political settlement as an “agreement among
powerful social groups that ends a conflict and sustains a set of insti-
tutions and a distribution of power that delivers an acceptable distri-
bution of benefits” (Khan, 2018).
On the benefits on political settlement to this study, Khan (2010)
has indicated that political settlement is generally used to describe the
informal power arrangements or “social order” in a state or an organi-
zation. The political settlement theory has emerged as a framework
for explaining and analysing the relationships and interactions
between elites, powers, and institutions. Political settlement explains
why apparently similar institutions perform very differently in differ-
ent situations (Khan, 2010).
Khan (2010) further submitted that a political settlement is a
“combination of power and institutions that are mutually compatible
and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.”
However, in this section of the research, the political settlement
theory is presented in order to gain deeper insight into the concept
and how it can be applied to the contemporary issues of petroleum
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products pricing in Ghana. This framework is considered appropriate
for this study because it helped the researcher explain how actors and
institutions interact to shape the pricing of petroleum products in
Ghana.
2.2 | Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework of this study is adopted from the political
settlement theory used in this study. The conceptual framework
developed was necessary so to give clearer understanding to the the-
ory and how it can help address the objectives of the study. The con-
cepts in the political settlement framework such as institutions and
actors among others have been put together to form the conceptual
framework.
From the framework (Figure 1) below, concerns about the pricing
of petroleum products from the environment (public) get to the actors
who formulate and implement the pricing of fuel through petition,
demonstrations, or debates. The actors (state and non-state actors)
operate by formal and informal rules and procedures. The concerns by
both state and non-state actors are addressed through dialogue, nego-
tiation, collaborations, and interactions. When these processes are
properly handled and addressed, it would lead to good governance,
economic growth, political stability, transparency, and flexibility. Nev-
ertheless, if the issues and concerns from the environment with regard
to the pricing of petroleum products are not properly addressed, it
may lead to political instability, stagnation, and bad governance.
2.3 | The political economy
Political economy is a strategic concept in analysing the effectiveness
of development among countries. The Department for International
Development (DFID) has defined political economy to mean the inter-
actions between the political and economic processes in a country
that focuses on how power and wealth are distributed among individ-
uals and different groups and the processes that enhance, sustain, and
transform these processes (DFID, 2009). The processes in the political
economy concept are linked with the politics and economic processes
that will generate resources and influence how political choices
are made.
Political economy analysis is very useful, especially for develop-
ment practitioners. This is because it helps the practitioners to under-
stand how political behaviours of groups are driven. The concept
helps to know how policies and programmes of countries are shaped.
Moreover, political economy helps in understanding the interests
and concerns of different groups in the society.
Political economy helps political elites create effective policies,
which outcomes promote development. Nevertheless, if policies for-
mulated by political elites are not strong, it will hinder development
(DFID, 2009; Newton, 2001).
According to the political economy literature (Abdulai & Hickey,
2016; DFID, 2009; Khan, 2017), political economy evolves around the
following concepts, powers, institutions (laws, rules, customs, and
values), and networks, that shape and influence the policies of
governments.
F IGURE 1 Conceptual framework. Abbreviations: IMF, International Monetary Fund; NPA, National Petroleum Authority; WB, World Bank
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The concept of power used in this study refers to the holding
power that was explained in recent studies (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016;
Khan, 2017). Abdulai and Hickey (2016) used holding power in their
study, The politics of development under competitive clientelism: Insights
from Ghana's education sector, to explain the politics behind the distri-
bution of resources in the educational sector.
A similar study had been conducted by Tom Goodfellow (2014)
before the study by Abdulai and Hickey (2016). Goodfellow (2014)
used holding power to explain Rwanda's political settlement and the
urban transition. However, a recent study by Behuria, Buur, and Gray
(2017) has defined holding power as the capability of an individual or
group to engage and survive in struggles. The researcher of this study
sees holding power as the energy that keeps groups or individuals
moving in spite of difficulties or struggles. There is holding power
when groups or individuals have the capacity to impose costs on
others and also the capacity to absorb costs inflicted on them
(Behuria et al., 2017).
It must be noted that institutions also play significant roles in
achieving political settlement. North (1990) defined institutions as the
rules of the game. Institution is seen as a crucial political economy var-
iable that helps in structuring policymaking in ways that favour some
outcomes over others. Institutions guide the interactions, negotia-
tions, competitions, and collaborations of the actors involved in
influencing policy decisions. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) referred to
institutions as the “rules and procedures that structure social interac-
tion by constraining and enabling actors' actions and inactions.”
Networks refer to empirically set of actors and their relationships
(Shearer, Abelson, Kouyaté, Lavis, & Walt, 2016). Networks look at
how individuals or organizations are involved in the policymaking pro-
cesses and how they are connected vis-à-vis through relationships.
The governance or management structures that are set aside with
agency to act strategically are also referred to as networks. It can be
deduced from the literature of Shearer et al. (2016) that networks
involve group of actors and their relationships.
2.3.1 | Actors in the pricing of fuel in Ghana
There are individuals and organizations whose actions and inactions
influence the pricing of petroleum products. These individuals and
organizations are known as actors (Akosa, 2016). According to Cahn
(2013) actors are grouped into state and non-state actors. State actors
operate by formal institutions, whereas non-state actors operate by
informal institutions. State actors in the petroleum downstream may
include Ministry of Energy (MoE) and the National Petroleum Author-
ity (NPA; Energy Commission, 2013). Non-state actors, on the other
hand with regard to the petroleum downstream, may include the oil
marketing companies (OMCs), bulk oil distribution companies (BDCs),
and energy think tanks among others (Ohemeng, 2005).
2.3.2 | The petroleum downstream in Ghana
The petroleum downstream sector is actual where the petroleum poli-
cies are implemented. The study actually focused on the petroleum
downstream to look at how the prices of petroleum products are
influenced. When it comes to the petroleum industry, there are the
petroleum upstream, middle stream, and petroleum downstream
(Amponsah & Opei, 2014). Literature by the Organisation of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, 2012) has revealed that the
petroleum downstream involves the refining, transportation, product
storage, distribution, and retailing. A research by Ambituuni, Amezaga,
and Emeseh (2014) on the safety and environmental regulations for
downstream petroleum industry operations in Nigeria links with OPEC
(2012) view of the petroleum downstream. According to Ambituuni
et al. (2014) proper management of the petroleum downstream con-
tributes effectively to the growth and development of the petroleum
sector.
In Ghana, Amponsah and Opei (2014) have posited that the
growth of the petroleum industry is highly dependent on ensuring
that petroleum products produced at the downstream are distributed
consistently through efficient and supply system. The literature by
Amponsah and Opei (2014) reflects the views by OPEC (2012) and
Ambituuni et al. (2014) on the petroleum downstream.
Moreover, literature by Amponsah and Opei (2014) have revealed
some of the actors in the petroleum downstream. According to the
scholars (Amponsah & Opei, 2014), the actors implement and influ-
ence the pricing of fuel. They are the Ministry of Petroleum, NPA,
OMCs, BDCs, and think tanks: Africa Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP).
3 | METHODOLOGY
The logical moulds that influenced the study is the interpretive
assumption of research (Scotland, 2012). The interpretive research
paradigm or philosophical assumption holds that individuals build their
own personal interpretations and understanding to the experiences
they encounter in the field of research in which they live and work
(Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007).
The researcher adopted the qualitative approach in its data collec-
tion, analysis, and discussion. The qualitative method is deemed
appropriate for this research because it enhances knowledge and
deepens understanding on how actors interact to influence the pricing
of petroleum products in Ghana. The study employed a qualitative
research in the sense that it requires an in-depth understanding of
how actors influence petroleum product pricing.
The population of the study was all actors in the petroleum down-
stream who are involved in the pricing of petroleum products in
Ghana. However, the accessible populations were the key actors in
the petroleum downstream who implement and influence the pricing
of fuel. They are the MoE, NPA, OMCs, BDCs, and think tanks: ACEP
and an energy policy expert from the Kumasi Institute of Technology
and Environment. The respondents from these organizations were
experienced officials who have been in the petroleum industry for
over 10 years.
The researcher employed two sampling techniques. They were
convenience and purposive techniques.
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Purposive sampling was used to select the six organizations, four
non-state actors, and two state actors. Actors selected were informa-
tion rich and had greater insight and characteristics relevant to the
research objectives. Moreover, through the convenience sampling,
the researcher selected the organizations and the respondents on the
basis of their accessibility.
In all, 24 respondents were sampled for the study. Qualitative data
were gathered through oral interviews of eight respondents from the
NPA, eight respondents from the MoE, three respondents from the
Association of OMC, two respondents from LHS Energy Ghana
(BDC), two officials from ACEP (energy think tank), and two officials
from the Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment (KITE),
energy and environment research institute.
The aim of the sampling technique was to ensure that the key or
main actors in the pricing of petroleum products are interviewed for
the study (Yin, 2009).
Summary of the sample size is shown in Table 1 below:
The study combined both primary and secondary data. Primary
data were gathered through a semi-structured interview guide matrix
for the in-depth interview schedules. The secondary data were drawn
from scholarly journal articles, relevant books, and reports from recog-
nized institutions (such as the World Bank, IMF, and NPA) that were
related to the study.
The official instrument for the study was an in-depth interview
guide matrix. The interview guide matrix was designed to moderate
the interviews in order to carry out the research. The interviews that
were conducted were face-to-face interviews with the respondents.
The interviews that were conducted by the researcher were tape
recorded. However, at the NPA, the researcher was not allowed to
record the respondents due to the security situation at the NPA. This
implies that the eight respondents from the NPA were not tape
recorded. The researcher noted down all the responses from the NPA
officials in the researcher's notebook. With regard to the respondents
who were tape recorded from other respondents, they were 16 in
number.
It is important to note that all the interviews that were tape
recorded were transcribed with the support of the Google document
software. A verbatim transcription of the data collected was done to
ensure reliability and validity of findings for the qualitative research.
The interview and discussion questions were adapted from the
works done by Amponsah and Opei (2014). Data were collected in a
5-month period (September 2017 to January 2018) during respon-
dents' available time. The research objectives served as a guide to the
identification and selections of the themes. The data analysis was
done on the basis of the themes that emerged from the discussions
and interviews in relation to the research questions to enable the
researcher to make logical deductions and conclusions (Miles,
Huberman & Saldana, 2013).
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The results and the discussions of the study are presented and dis-
cussed in accordance with the objectives of the study: to examine the
power struggles among key actors involved in the pricing of petro-
leum products in Ghana and to unpack the interests of the actors and
their policy outcomes.
4.1 | Powers and interests of actors
In this section, the powers and interest of the key actors in the fuel
pricing in Ghana are presented and discussed.
The key actors that implement the pricing of petroleum products
in Ghana according to majority of the respondents are the NPA and
MoE (state actors) and the OMCs (non-state actor). However, it was
further revealed by the respondents that there are other actors who
may not be seen as the main actors in the pricing of fuel in Ghana but
they are influential in the pricing formulation. They are the BDCs and
energy policy think tanks. Nevertheless, the actor that has been man-
dated by the Government of Ghana to oversee the management of
the petroleum industry with other actors is the NPA. It is important to
note that the MoE (state actor) has powers in formulating policies
regarding the pricing of fuel in Ghana. The MoE is the policymaker
who develops the policies and gives other actors the capacity to
implement them. Though the NPA is the main actor in implementing
the prices of fuel in Ghana, MoE sees the NPA as one of its agencies
under the MoE. In exercising their mandates as state actors, MoE
TABLE 1 Sampling summary
Organisation/actors No Position Total





















1 Executive Director 2
1 Official
African Centre for Energy
Policy (ACEP)









1 Executive Director 1
Total 24 24
Source: Author's construct
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ensures that other actors do the right thing on the basis of the policies
they have formulated.
Moreover, the non-state actors, OMCs, BDCs, and energy policy
think tanks see themselves as relevant and key players in the petro-
leum downstream. For instance, when it comes to the investment and
setting up of pump stations, it is the mandate of the OMCs. They
decide to sell or not to sell fuel.
A respondent said,
“the control and ownership of the filling stations is our
preserve rights” (interview with respondent, OMC,
February 9, 2018).
The issue raised by the OMCs with regard to their control and
ownership of the pump stations in Ghana may be true because Shell,
Total, and Unity Oil among others are the properties of individuals
and other private organizations. For example, when all fuel pump sta-
tions owners decide that they will not sell their fuel to consumers in a
day, the consequences would be huge. Businesses would be affected.
Transport owners would be affected. The industries would not be left
out also.
However, not all OMCs in Ghana are private (GOIL, 2018). There
is an OMC called the Ghana Oil Company Limited (GOIL), which is a
government-owned company.
Non-state actors also exercise what is called the “court of public”
opinion in the pricing of fuel. What this means is that some energy
policy think tanks (for instance, ACEP) educate and inform the public
about the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana.
In a current study by Khan (2018), in a reply to Tim Kelsall (2018)
on Power, pacts and political settlements, Khan (2018) stated that state
actors exercise a lot of powers in their bid to implement policies. This
kind of power is a called the holding power. With regard to the state
actors, they are given powers to act according to the Constitutions of
Republic of Ghana.
In spite of the powers that the actors in the pricing of petroleum
products exert, they have some interests. The consumer interest has
become more paramount to the state actors. It must be noted that
20 out of the 24 respondents representing 83% response rate said
consumer interest is one of their major interests.
Although the state actors focus on winning the public, they are
also interested to win the hearts of the people. The MoE ensures that
consumers of petroleum products are not victimized or mistreated by
buying overly inflated fuel at the various fuel pump stations. State
actors see to it that consumers do not suffer from the high prices of
petroleum products from the market.
Also, fair play and peaceful market are areas that interest the state
actors. One respondent posited:
“We want to see to it that all players are involved in
the pricing of petroleum products and are treated fairly
in such a way that competitions with the OMCs are
fair” (interview with respondent, MoE, February
15, 2018).
However, the major non-state actors (OMCs and BDCs) in the
pricing of fuel are interest in making decent returns like other busi-
nesses. This may account for the reasons why some pump stations
charge higher prices of fuel than others.
Another area of interest to the state actors is the economy. The
state actor (government) is to ensure that there is stability in the pric-
ing of petroleum products in the market. State actors ensure that
there is enough fuel in the country.
4.2 | Power struggles among key actors
The powers and interests of the actors in the pricing of fuel have been
discussed in the previous section. However, before unearthing the
power struggles among the key actors in the pricing of fuel, it is
appropriate to tease out the most powerful among the key actors in
the pricing of fuel in Ghana.
On the most influential and powerful among the key actors, data
gathered (19 out of the 24 respondents representing 79% response
rate) revealed that the regulator, which is the NPA is influential in
determining the prices of fuel.
The respondents revealed that the NPA is the most influential in
the pricing of fuel in Ghana due to their decisions concerning pricing
of fuel and the implementation of the fuel policy.
The NPA is influential in determining the pricing of fuel in Ghana
because it decides on everything regarding the pricing of petroleum
products. One of the officials at the NPA indicated:
“the NPA is like a referee on the pitch and can decide
on anything in relation to the pricing of fuel” (inter-
view with respondent, NPA, March 15, 2018).
The NPA Act 691 gives the justification to why the NPA is power-
ful and influential in the pricing of petroleum products. NPA has
84 provisions in the NPA Act 691 that empower the authority to
function effectively and take decisions concerning the pricing of fuel
in Ghana.
Another reason why the state actor (NPA) is considered more
powerful in determining the price of petroleum products in Ghana is
that it monitors the petroleum pricing policies to ensure that all other
actors conform to the fuel policy decisions.
The NPA is more powerful than the other actors in the pricing of
fuel in Ghana according to one respondent at the NPA:
“on the 6th May 2016, the CEO of the NPA ordered a
task force to the Western, Upper West, Upper East,
Northern and the Volta regions of Ghana to ensure
that the rules and regulations regarding petroleum
price deregulation are duly followed by the Oil Market-
ing Companies in those areas. The task force were
mandated to check how fuel prices are displayed and
how dispensers at the filling stations are working in
those regions” (interview with respondent, NPA,
March 15, 2018).
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The above example shows that the NPA can close fuel pump sta-
tions that are not operating legally. They also ensure that all actors
abide by the rules and regulations regarding the fuel pricing policy.
After the respondents have revealed that the NPA is powerful
among the actors, the researcher was concerned and wondered about
the other actors: OMCs, Tema Oil Refinery, Bulk Oil Storage and
Transportation Company Limited, and BDCs among others. Are they
not also important and powerful?
Majority of the respondents at the NPA disclosed that the actors
are important in the pricing but they are all active players in the petro-
leum downstream. For instance, Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation
Company Limited has to maintain the strategic reserves, and Tema Oil
Refinery refines most petroleum products for the oil market.
Study by Amoah (2011) has supported the findings of the respon-
dents concerning the influence of the NPA in the petroleum down-
stream. Amoah (2011) has posited that, by law, the NPA is mandated
to oversee and monitor the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana in
order to ensure efficiency, growth, and stakeholder's satisfaction. The
NPA issues license and can withdraw the license required to operate
in the petroleum downstream; this has made them the practitioners
when it comes to the pricing of fuel.
More importantly, what makes the NPA more powerful is how the
chief executive officer (CEO) is appointed. The CEO is appointed by
the President of the Republic of Ghana in accordance with Article
70 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. However,
Idun-Arkhurst (2012) have linked the kind of power and influence by
the NPA to a type of political settlement called the competitive cli-
entelism. Competitive clientelism implies the use of electoral competi-
tion to gain control of the realms of the state and the distribution of
resources to the rank and file of ruling coalitions.
4.2.1 | Mechanisms for influencing fuel prices
Actors influence the pricing of petroleum products in several ways.
Majority of the respondents who spoke about how actors influence
the pricing of fuel revealed that the key actors influence fuel prices
through taxes/levies, policy guidelines, exchange rate, and legal
actions against the government.
The first is through taxes. When it comes to introducing taxes and
levies in the country, the government is responsible for this act. The
government influences petroleum prices by introducing new taxes or
removing taxes. When government introduces new taxes, what it
means is that the prices of petroleum products will increase. When
the price of fuel products increase, they affect all sectors of the econ-
omy, in terms of transportation and agriculture among others.
All other things are being equal, when government removes or
decreases taxes; what it shows is that the prices of fuel will decrease.
This will cause the prices of goods and services to also decrease. An
official interviewed revealed:
“About 45 percent of the price component in the
petroleum price build-up comes from taxes and levies.
So if government adds more taxes, it will increase the
prices of petroleum products and become a burden on
the people” (interview with respondent, NPA, March
15, 2018).
Second, actors influence the prices of petroleum products through
the policy guidelines by the NPA. Ghana is now in the deregulation
regime where the forces of demand and supply determine the prices
of fuel. However, the NPA still gives policy guidelines that show the
OMCs and BDCs how to price their products. There is price ceiling
that the NPA gives to the petroleum service providers that guides
them on the percentages to price their products. With this, you can-
not go beyond this price ceiling given.
The third one is the exchange rate, which is also a major compo-
nent in the pricing of fuel. The exchange rate is as a result of govern-
ment policy so the monetary and fiscal policy determines the
exchange rate. So if the government does well and the economies are
good, the exchange rate will be okay.
Furthermore, on the issue of how actors influence the pricing of
fuel, another means is by taking legal actions against the government.
Governments are sometimes taken to court to demand clarity in the
petroleum pricing policy.
Through this legal action, respondent said:
“I will say that it even serve as a check and actually get
the people to pay attention to what goes on in the
pricing policy” (interview with respondent, think tank
[ACEP], March 15, 2018).
An instance to support the legal actions claim against the govern-
ment according to a respondent at ACEP was when, in 2013,
Mr. Kwaku Kwarteng who is a member of parliament took the regula-
tors of fuel to court for charging too many taxes/levies on fuel and
are illegal. He won the case at the court that some of the taxes the
regulators have collected were illegal and the government should
refund them. However, after the court's ruling; thus, for 2 to 3 years
now, the government has not taken off some of the taxes. Those
taxes are still being collected even though the court said they are ille-
gal. Linking this instance to literature, Raymond and Weldon (2014)
argued that the informal institution influences and shapes a policy by
reinforcing existing norms that promote desired social change in the
society or organization, challenging existing norms that obstruct
change in the country, by invoking alternative norms to create new
policy opportunities and creation of new norms to enhance policy
development in the state.
4.2.2 | The power struggles
Because the powers and how actors influence the pricing of fuel have
been disclosed in the preceding section, it is appropriate to discuss
how they (actors) react among themselves towards the pricing of fuel.
It is interesting to reveal that 17 out of the 24 respondents rep-
resenting 70% response rate indicated that there are power struggles
among the actors involved in the pricing of fuel in Ghana.
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Power struggles among actors in the pricing of petroleum prod-
ucts according to the respondents interviewed can be seen in the
areas of conflict of interest among actors, separate views by the NPA
and other petroleum service providers, BDCs who are OMCs, and
energy sector levy.
Khan (2017) and Abdulai and Hickey (2016) have referred to this
power as the holding power. Abdulai and Hickey (2016) used holding
power in their study, The politics of development under competitive cli-
entelism: Insights from Ghana's education sector, to explain the politics
behind the distribution of resources in the educational sector.
A study by Behuria et al. (2017) has defined holding power as the
capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in struggles.
The holding power results as different groups or organizations contest
in the distribution of resources. The balance or distribution of power
is among competing social groups or classes. The process of balancing
power or resource distribution among competing groups brings about
the power struggle (Di John & Putzel, 2009). In the pricing of fuel,
there are groups such as the state and non-state actors who struggle
and compete over the pricing of petroleum products. Relating the
power struggles to the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana, an
official at the MoE disclosed that
“Power struggle in the pricing of petroleum products is
seen as when actors in the pricing of fuel try to mussel
their way out during policy implementation” (interview
with respondent, MoE, April 5, 2018).
Conflict of interest among the state actors
In determining the prices of petroleum products, there are sometimes
conflicts or struggles between the MoE and the NPA. The MoE for-
mulates the petroleum pricing policy and may want certain things to
be done in certain ways. The NPA on the other hand is the regulator.
The NPA is composed of the technocrats, people with the technical
know-how in the pricing of fuel. They may also want things to be
done in their favour. This may result into power struggles among the
two bodies.
A respondent revealed from the MoE stated:
“As a matter of fact, there are always friction and
struggles in the petroleum downstream through inter-
fering in the activities of organizations of the state”
(interview with respondent, MoE, April 5, 2018).
Separate views by NPA and other petroleum service providers
A specific instance given by one of the respondents concerning the
power struggles was that
“In July 2015, the NPA had given directives to the
OMCs about how petroleum products should be
priced. The policy was that all petroleum service pro-
viders should apply the prescribed pricing formula
when selling fuel to consumers. But it appeared that
majority of the BDCs and OMCs were not complying
with the NPA directives” (interview with respondent,
ACEP, March 3, 2018).
According to a respondent, the actual indicative prices of fuel at
the fuel pump stations should have been GHC 3.29 pesewas per litre
and GHC 2.92 pesewas per litre for petrol and diesel respectively in
July 2015. But the BDCS and OMCs were not charging these prices.
Some of the BDCs and OMCs were charging different prices above
the normal prices. Policy think tanks like ACEP saw this as a cheat on
the citizenry and threatened to sue the BDCs and OMCs at the law
court for charging illegal and unwarranted fuel prices.
Nevertheless, the BDCs and OMCs responded to the issues raised
by the policy think tanks and argued that there were existing stocks
that needed to be sold before implementing the policies initiated by
NPA. That was the reason they were charging different prices.
BDCs who are OMCs
Moreover, there was another power struggle among the BDCs and
OMCs. There are some OMCs who are also BDCs, for example, Shell
and GOIL. These OMCs sell to consumers of fuel and at the same time
also import through their BDCs.
A respondent revealed that if there are OMCs that sell to con-
sumers their fuel and at the same time import, it means they are creat-
ing integrated market. The cost of operations will be lower than other
OMCs that do not import their own fuel. In view of this, the smaller
oil companies are collapsing. It appears the stronger OMCs perform
the roles of BDCs by importing their own fuel. This according to the
respondents is price power play among OMCs and BDCs.
A respondent revealed:
“On the 1st of February 2016, GOIL reduced their fuel
price by 4 percent. And if you want to compete with
them, you have to reduce” (interview with respondent,
ACEP, March 3, 2018).
Meanwhile, maybe if other OMCs are reducing by 4% as GOIL
was implementing, they would make losses. However, GOIL has this
advantage because they are BDCs and at the same time OMCs. GOIL
have their own tankers, but other OMCs have to rent a tanker before
they can get oil. This is affecting the smaller companies.
The energy sector levy issue
According to the business and price analyst at the OMCs, there have
been a lot of power struggles in the pricing of fuel. A specific example
of power struggle in the pricing of fuel was the implementation of the
energy sector levy. There was an increase in the petroleum prices
between 18% and 27%. There is a power struggle because the energy
sector levy is an issue that is going to affect the prices of fuel in the
country, and the petroleum industry and other actors have a stake in
it too; conflicting interests by actors will cause power struggles among
actors in the pricing of fuel.
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A respondent from the Association of OMCs indicated the reason
for the energy sector levy introduced by the government in these
words:
“The Government needed to settle certain debt that
they own the BDCs and other companies and they
needed an extra amount of money to offset that debt.
They also needed a certain amount of money to cush-
ion the road fund and because of that, they went
ahead to introduce the tax” (interview with respon-
dent, OMC, March 10, 2018).
4.2.3 | How struggles among key actors are resolved
After the competitions and struggles among social groups and classes
(Di John & Putzel, 2009) as in the case of the actors involved in the
pricing of petroleum products, there should be a way to resolve
issues. Khan (2018) has suggested that the political settlement
approach would help resolve such struggles among the actors. Politi-
cal settlement looks at shaping common understanding between com-
peting groups or classes by serving their interests.
To resolve the struggles among competing groups, it demands that
actors in the petroleum downstream consider the interests of various
actors and devise an appropriate mechanism such as effective and
peaceful dialogue, negotiation, collaboration, and understanding
among the competing groups. These variables (effective and peaceful
dialogue, negotiation, collaboration, and understanding among the
competing groups) are shown in the settlement box of the conceptual
framework of this study.
Respondents indicated that the illegal and unwarranted prices of
fuel can be resolved when the NPA continues to monitor the prices
of fuel charged by the BDCs and OMCs so as to ensure stable
prices of petroleum products. The NPA from time to time should
educate the public very well about the introduction of any tax
or levies.
4.3 | Actors' interests and policy outcomes
On the basis of the findings and discussions done so far, it can be seen
that the actors involved in the pricing of fuel are influential. They also
have their interests. However, the researcher wanted to find out who
among the actors interests result in policy.
Majority of the respondents revealed that some actors influence
results into policy. The actors identified by the respondents were the
NPA, BDCs, IMF, and energy policy think tanks.
Some respondents interviewed disclosed that the NPA interests
and influences sometimes results in policy. The reason for this
response was that the NPA from time to time gives technical advice
and recommendations to the government on how petroleum prod-
ucts should be priced. The NPA comprises people with technical
skills and training that can be used to affect petroleum pricing
decisions.
Other respondents indicated that when it comes to the actors
whose influence results into policy in the petroleum downstream, it is
the BDCs who bring the petroleum products into Ghana. According to
a respondent,
“The fuel deregulation policy came as a result of some
influences from the BDCs. The Government didn't
want all the costs to be passed onto the consumers
when the international market price of oil increases”
(interview with respondent, LHS, February 5, 2018).
Respondents suggested that the Government of Ghana should
absorb or subsidize some of the cost of the petroleum products that
the BDCs import into Ghana so that the consumers of fuel are not
burdened.
Apart from the NPA, as well as BDCs, another actor that the
respondents revealed was the IMF. This is an international and a non-
state actor. Not just the BDCs influence results into policy but also
the IMF.
One of the respondents revealed:
“The IMF suggested to Ghana that if it needed loans
for development then no more subsidies” (interview
with respondent, KITE, May 5, 2018).
This directive from the IMF might have influenced Ghana to adopt
the deregulation policy of pricing petroleum products in Ghana.
An interview with a respondent from the ACEP disclosed that
think tanks or civil society organizations interest influence policy
outcomes.
According to a respondent:
“Recently the Government of Ghana has introduced
the energy debt recovery levy. This came as results of
some of their calls for the policy” (interview with
respondent, KITE, May 5, 2018).
Energy think tanks have supported and been campaigning for the
deregulation petroleum pricing in Ghana. Think tanks called the gov-
ernment to allow Ghanaians pay the realistic price to the implementa-
tion of the deregulation policy. They have become the watchdog in
the petroleum price deregulation regime.
It has been disclosed by the respondents that when it comes to
whose influence results into policy, it is the NPA, BDCs, IMF, and
think tanks. However, the kind of democracy or system of governance
that is in Ghana does not allow actors to function effectively. All these
actors are independent bodies and are supposed to function autono-
mously. However, with the majority of the executive body in parlia-
ment, the oversight that parliament is supposed to give or provide
does not exist because everything that goes to parliament gets
passed.
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Nevertheless, if Ghana has had a hung parliament where the ruling
government have the minority in parliament, then some of these
things should have been checked and scrutinized and some of the
objections should be taken into consideration.
Unfortunately, any person who wins the presidency in Ghana
always has majority in parliament. This has been like that from the
year 1992 to 2016 (where the last election was held). Because major-
ity of the parliamentarians normally come from the ruling government,
their interest always result into policy.
When the sitting government have majority of the ministers in
parliament, everything that goes to parliament easily passes. Khan's
competitive clientelism asserts that in developing countries, political
stability is not maintained through fiscal policy but through the largely
off-budget and selective accommodation of factions organized along
patron–client lines' (Khan, 2005).
On the basis of the instances indicated above, it can be seen that
if the researcher is looking at whose influence results into policy, it is
always the state actors. This is because the system of governance that
is in Ghana does not allow a lot of divergent views to be tolerated in
the policy formulation process. This does not make policies very
effective in Ghana.
5 | CONCLUSION
This study has shown the interplay between politics and the actors
involved in the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana. Through the
political settlement approach, attention has been drawn to key issues
regarding how political economy factors like powers, institutions, and
networks influence the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana.
Respondents have linked the powers by the actors to holding power
as indicated by Khan (2018).
The research identified the state actor (NPA) to be more powerful
and influential in implementing the prices of petroleum products in
Ghana due to the competitive clientelism of political settlement in
operation. Actors such as NPA, BDCs, IMF, and energy policy think
tanks interest results in policy. This form of political calculus (political
settlement) shapes the manner in which petroleum products are
priced in Ghana.
The findings of the study suggest the existence of power struggles
among the key actors in the pricing of fuel. The findings revealed that
the NPA, BDCs, OMCs, IMF, and energy policy think tanks influence
result into policy. Actors influence fuel prices through taxes, policy
guidelines, exchange rate, and legal actions. The findings of this study
have significant implications for both theory and policy, particularly
with regard to the recent issues on petroleum pricing politics and
political settlements.
The findings of the study validate the assertions by Abdulai and
Hickey (2016) that the government of the day, which comes to power
through electoral competition, uses their mandate to influence policies.
The political system in Ghana's Fourth Republic where majority of
parliamentarians belong to the ruling government make policies
receive quick legal backing with the majority support. This accounts
for why the state actor(s) are influential and powerful in determining
fuel prices. This research will enable researchers know and analyse
the critical issues regarding the political economic factors that shape
the pricing of petroleum products. This study also proposes an appro-
priate framework to analyse political economy issues. The findings of
this research would add more value to the energy practitioners, aca-
demics, and policymakers in Ghana, other countries in the sub-
Saharan African countries, and the developed countries as well. The
study recommends that capacity of the key players should be built by
the Government of Ghana so as to ensure healthy competition and
stability in the pricing of petroleum products in Ghana. Political inter-
ference in the pricing of fuel should be limited so that the key players
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